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THE SALES TAX AND TRANSACTIONS IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
E. M.

PERKINS*

The development of state sales taxation in recent years has made
the taxpayer and the tax official increasingly aware of the Commerce
Clause of the Federal Constitution and its restrictions on taxation.'
In order to supplement diminished revenues from other forms of
taxes and in an effort to decrease the tax burden on property, a number of states have adopted some form of sales tax and the prospects
are that other states soon will enter this field.2 Due to the immunity
from privilege taxation which transactions in interstate commerce
enjoy, the taxpayer finds that sometimes it is convenient and prof* Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina.
± Nowhere does the Constitution expressly forbid the states to tax interstate
commerce. The Commerce Clause [Art. I, §8, cl. 3], gives Congress the power
"To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian tribes". The restrictions on taxation result from judicial
interpretation of this clause.
'The sales tax appears in a variety of forms. In California, Illinois, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Oregon (effective March 9, 1934) and Utah,
the tax is imposed on the privilege of selling tangible personal property at
retail, and is a uniform percentage of the gross receipts. The rates range from
one per cent in New York and Oklahoma to three per cent in Michigan and
North Carolina. In Arizona, Indiana, Mississippi, Washington and West Virginia the acts apply to production as well as to consumption sales, and in
Indiana, Mississippi, South Dakota and West Virginia they are comprehensive
gross income statutes. Pennsylyania imposes a merchants' license tax at a very
low rate, measured by gross sales. Kentucky and New Mexico have merchants'
license taxes graduated according to gross sales. Connecticut imposes a gross
income tax on unincorporated business. Vermont has a merchants' license tax
measured by sales. The exemption of gross sales of fifty thousand dollars
seems to make this in effect a chain store tax. Virginia and Delaware tax
merchants according to their purchases.
See, Ariz. Laws 1st. Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 17; CALiF. STAT. 1933, c. 1020;
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §§1340-1349; DEL. Rv. CODE (1915) §198; Ill. Laws
1933 p. 924; Ind. Acts 1933, c. 50; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, Supp. 1933) §4202, Al12; Mich. Pub. Acts 1933, H. B. 184; Miss. Gen. Laws 1932, c. 90; N. M. Laws
1933, c. 73; N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 281; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933)
§7880 (156); Okla. Laws Ex. Sess. 1933, c. 66, art. 9, §§1052-68; Ore. Laws
2d. Spec. Sess. 1933, H. B. 110; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, §2621;
S. D. Laws 1933, S. B. 101; Utah Laws 1933, c. 63; Vermont Acts 1933, H. B.
115; VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1932) Tax Code, §188; Wash. Laws 1933,
c. 191; W. Va. Acts Ex. Sess. 1933, c. 33.
Georgia had a sales tax from October 1, 1929 until December 31, 1931.
GA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1930) §993 (316)-(341). Pennsylvania had a
sales tax for a six months' period ending February 28, 1933. Pa. Acts Spec.
Sess. 1932, Act. 53. The gross income tax adopted in North Dakota (N. D.
Laws, 1933, S. B. 315) was defeated at a special election, September 22, 1933.
See N. Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1933, at .2.
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itable to bring his purchase or sale under this constitutional protection. The tax official finds that these transactions constitute a fairsized volume of business which he feels should be taxed on a parity
with intrastate sales. And the local merchant is aggrieved to discover
that he is losing trade to business houses in other states.
Intrastate business is placed at a distinct disadvantage. Very
often it is equally as convenient and economical to order goods from
beyond the state's borders as to purchase locally, and when there is in
addition the opportunity of saving even a small amount in taxes,
local business and the state's revenues are bound to suffer. In some
jurisdictions this loss of business from local buyers should be counter-balanced by the business gained from without the state. That
probably is true only of the more commercial states. And even so,
the trade loss of the small retailer is not recouped by that class of
trade. The shift is to the nationally-known firms. Nor is it a question of one state losing the sales tax and another gaining it, because
the transaction cannot be taxed in any state while it is shielded by the
Commerce Clause.3
To be sure, it cannot be charged that the Commerce Clause is at
present alone responsible for the grievances of the local merchant and
the tax official. So long as there is an absence of uniformity in the
tax systems of the states, taxpayers will endeavor to confine their
activities to the most favorable jurisdictions. 4 The decisions under
the Commerce Clause simply make escape easier. Remove this immunity and if the parties are determined to avoid a sales tax, they
are forced to make the sale in a non-taxing state. This latter device,
however, need not frustrate the sales tax program. The state may
supplement this tax with a production tax or with a consumption tax.
Whether either or both of these should be adopted will depend on the
policy behind the sales tax in the particular state. In some states the
purpose is to tax consumer sales and not to place this tax on produc'Robins v, Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 30

L. ed. 694 (1887) ; Norfolk and Western R. Co. v. Sims, 191 U. S. 441, 24 Sup.

Ct. 151, 48 L. ed. 254 (1903) ; Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S.
325, 45 Sup. Ct. 525, 69 L. ed. 982 (1925); see Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsyl-

vania, 245 U. S. 292, 38 Sup. Ct. 126, 62 L. ed. 295 (1917).

' Illustrated in another tax field by the attempts of corporations to attribute
income to activities in states without income taxes or taxing at low rates. See,
Breckenridge, Tax Escape by Manipulations of Holding Company (1931)

9

N. C. L. REv. 189; Magill, Allocation of Income by Corporate Contract (1931)
44 HAv. L. Rvv. 935; Huston, Allocation of Corporate Net Income for Purposes of Taxation (1932) 26 Ia,. L. REv. 725; notes (1931) 40 YALE L. J.
1273; (1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 470.
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tion.5 To effectuate this plan the state might pattern the tax after
the gasoline statutes and tax the sale or use of the article.6 Where
the policy is to tax production as well as consumption the statute
7
could apply to production, sale or use.

Why then is the immunity of sales in interstate commerce an impediment to state taxation? The difficulty is largely an administrative one. A tax otr production does not offend the Commerce Clause
and doubtless is as effective as a tax on the sale of the product.3
But the consumption tax is more troublesome. First, the decisions
say that the use of the article in interstate commerce cannot be
taxed.9 Second, and far more important in the hunt for revenue, it
would be impractical to attempt collection of a use tax as broad as
a sales tax. This, for the obvious reason that there are so many more
persons who buy and use than those who sell. It seems that a consumer sales tax state, such as North Carolina, would like to have the
power to collect a tax from out-of-state merchants on their sales to
purchasers within the state, If the tax were added to the selling
price, this would give the sales tax the consistency of exacting a
contribution from all local consumers.' 0
'Such states are: California, Illinois, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon and Utah. The taxes do not apply to sales for resale
and do not apply to production. Statutory references, supra note 2.
'IOWA CODE (1931) §5093-al, "A license fee . . . is hereby imposed on all
motor vehicle fuel used or otherwise disposed of in this state for any purpose
whatsoever. Any person using motor vehicle fuel within the State shall be
liable for the fee herein provided for unless the same shall have been previously paid." W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 11, art. 14, §3, taxes distributors on
"gasoline sold, purchased or used in this state. . . ' Wvyo. REv. STAr. (1931)
§115-1102, imposes a tax on "all gasoline used or sold in this state.
"
'Arizona, Indiana, Mississippi, South Dakota, Washington and West Virginia tax production. The taxes are measured by the value of production as
shown by the gross proceeds from sales. Statutory references, supra note 2.
'Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S.245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83, 67 L. ed.
237 (1922); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup. Ct. 526,

67 L. ed. 929 (1923) ; Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S.284, 47 Sup. Ct.

639, 71 L. ed. 1049 (1927) ; Utah Power and Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S.165,
52 Sup. Ct. 548, 76 L. ed. 1038 (1932); Powell, State Production Taxes and
The Commerce Clause (1923) 12 CAtuF. L. REv. 17; notes (1923) 32 YALE L. J.
406; (1927) 40 HAsv. L. Rlv. 908; (1932) 42 YALE L. J.94.
'Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S.69, 5 Sup. Ct.38, 28 L. ed. 653 (1884);
Pickard v. Pullman Co., 117 U. S.34, 6 Sup. Ct. 635, 29 L. ed. 785 (1886);
Helson v. Ientucky, 279 U. S.245, 49 Sup. Ct 279, 73 L. ed. 683 (1929);
Station WBT, Inc. v. Poulnot, 46 F (2d) 671 (E. D. S. C. 1931) ; notes (1931)
40 YALP L. J.990; (1931) 44 HAzv.L. REv. 992; (1931) 4 So. CA.n. L. REv.
298.
"The sales tax statutes of California, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Oregon forbid the vendor to advertise that the tax is not
an element in the price to the consumer. Under the North Carolina statute

"... the Commissioner of Revenue is empowered and directed to dpvise, pro-
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There is nothing new in the constitutional plight of the sales tax.
Indeed, the first tax case under the Commerce Clause, Brown v.
Maryland," decided that a license tax on importers and sellers of
foreign goods was repugnant to the power of Congress to regulate
foreign commerce. It has been an almost annual function of the
Court to nullify privilege taxes impinging on interstate commerce.
Yet in some other forms of taxation involving such commerce the
decisions, though perhaps not their language, have come a long way
from the absolutes of Chief Justice Marshalf. 12 The states can tax
net income l3 derived from interstate commerce and they can tax the
property employed therein. 14 And even in privilege taxation, though
adhering to the precepts of the immunity of interstate commerce, the
Court has indicated of late a tendency to find that the tax does not
fall on that commerce.1 5

The position of the sales tax will be unique, however, if that form
of taxation continues in development and becomes one of the major
mulgate and enforce regulations under which merchants shall collect from the
consumers ...

the sales tax levied upon their business. . . ."N. C. CODE ANx.

(Micdie, Supp. 1933) §7880 (156) cc. In Oregon, "The tax hereby imposed
shall be collected by the retailer from the consumer in so far as may reasonably
be done." Ore. Laws 2d. Spec. Sess. 1933, H. B. 110, §8.
12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678 (U. S. 1827). Maryland imposed a tax of
fifty dollars upon importers of foreign articles and other persons selling the
same at wholesale. The tax was held invalid as violating the constitutional
prohibition on state taxation of imports and as a regulation of foreign commerce.
""Questions of power do not depend on the degree to which it may be
exercised," said Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland. "The action of
the State as a regulation of interstate commerce does not depend upon the
degree of interference; it is illegal in any degree," said Mr. Justice McKenna,
a century later, in Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., supra note 8, at 259.
"United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S.321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, 62
L. ed. 1135 (1918) ; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S.37, 40 Sup. Ct. 221, 64 L. ed.
445 (1920) ; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S.113, 41 Sup.
Ct. 45, 65 L. ed. 165 (1920) ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Doughton, 262 U. S.
413, 43 Sup. Ct. 620, 67 L. ed. 1051 (1923).
" Marye v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., 127 U. S. 117, 8 Sup. Ct. 1037, 32
L. ed. 94 (1888); Postal Telegraph Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S.688, 15 Sup. Ct.
268, 39 L. ed. 311 (1895) ; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 166 U. S.185, 17 Sup.
Ct. 604, 41 L. ed. 965 (1897) ; American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174
U. S.70, 19 Sup. Ct. 599, 43 L. ed. 899 (1899) ; Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Gottlieb, 190 U. S.412, 23 Sup. Ct. 730, 47 L. ed. 1116 (1903).
"See Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289 U. S.249, 252, 53 Sup.
Ct. 591, 77 L. ed. 1155 (1933) ("A State may validly tax the 'use' to which
gasoline is put in withdrawing it from storage within the State, and placing it
in the tanks of the planes, notwithstanding that its ultimate function is to generate motive power for carrying on interstate commerce.") ; see also, Eastern
Air Transport, Inc. v. S. C. Tax Commission, 285 U. S.147, 52 Sup. Ct. 340, 76
L. ed. 673 (1932) ; Nashville etc. R. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345,
77 L. ed. 731 (1933).
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sources of revenue. As indicated, the Commerce Clause is not a
serious obstacle to the taxation of property and net income. A!though
goods cannot be taxed while in interstate transit,'

6

the property em-

17

ployed as agencies of the transit may be taxed, and it is likely that
the goods will at some time in the year be taxed in one state. That
does not nicely recompense every state for the protection afforded,
but in the absence of a satisfactory allocation formula the immunity
probably will continue. Net income may be taxed and it seems that
this may be done although the business from which it arises is entirely interstate.1 8 The gasoline tax incurs difficulties similar to the
sales tax but to a lesser extent due jointly to the fact that all states
have the tax and that in many states it applies to sale, distribution or
use.' 9 There is the evil of some purchases in states with low rates,
but if the purchases are of large volumes the use in the high tax state
can be detected and there taxed. 20 Privilege taxes, whether a corporation excise 2 1 or a general occupation tax, 22 may not be exacted
for the conduct of interstate business. So a foreign corporation or
" State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, 21 L. ed. 146 (U. S. 1873) ; Kelley
v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 259, 47 L. ed. 359 (1903); Champlain
Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U. S. 366, 43 Sup. Ct. 146, 67 L. ed. 309 (1922).
"Supra note 14.
' In Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, supra note 13, Mr. Justice
Brandeis said, "that a tax measured by net profits is valid, although these
profits may have been derived in part, or indeed mainly from interstate commerce is settled." Since a tax on net income is valid as being only an "indirect
burden" on interstate commerce, United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, supra
note 13, it should continue that status whether the income is all or only in part
derived from interstate commerce. See, Magill, Taxation, of Property and
Business as Affected by the Commerce Clause (1932) PRoC. NAT. TAX Ass'N.
242, 254; Powell, Contemporar.v Commerce Clause Controversies Over State
Taxation (1928) 76 U. PA. L. REv. 958, 963.
"Supra note 6.
'People v. City and County of Denver, 90 Colo. 598, 10 P. (2d) 1106
(1932) ; Burke v. Bass, 123 Neb. 297, 242 N. W. 606 (1932); George E. Breese
Lumber Co. v. Mirabal, 34 N. M. 643, 287 Pac. 699 (1930); Stedman v. City
of Winston-Salem, 204 N. C. 203, 167 S. E. 813 (1933) ; State v. City of Sioux
Falls, S. D., 244 N. W. 365 (1932); Crockett v. Salt Lake County, 72 Utah
337, 270 Pac. 142 (1928).
' Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 Sup. Ct. 184, 69 L. ed.
439 (1925); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45
Sup. Ct. 477, 69 L. ed. 916 (1925). If, however, the corporation does a local
business that privilege may be taxed although its measure includes interstate
commerce. Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290, 42 Sup. Ct.
305, 66 L. ed. 622 (1922) ; Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 281 U. S. 511,
50 Sup. Ct. 383, 74 L. ed. 1004 (1930). See Powell, State Excises on Foreign Corporations (1919) PROc. NAT. TAx Ass'N. 230; Powell, Business Taxes
and the Federal Constitution (1925) PRoc. NAT. TAX Ass'x. 164.
' Dozier v. Alabama 218 U. S. 124, 30 Sup. Ct. 649, 54 L. ed. 965 (1910);
Heyman v. Hays, 236 U. 8. 178, 35 Sup. Ct. 403, 59 L. ed. 527 (1915) ; supra
note 3.
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an individual engaging solely in interstate commerce receives a bounty
from the Commerce Clause. This immunity is comparable to that
enjoyed by interstate sales transactions, but the growth of sales taxation may mean that of the major forms of taxation, the sales tax
will suffer most from the immunity of interstate commerce. Is it
desirable to continue this discrimination against intrastate business?
Does a free movement of commerce among the states require this
exemption?
A study of the background of the Federal Convention of 1787
will show that one of the impelling reasons for the calling of that
Convention was the discriminatory legislation of the states directed
at the commerce of their neighbors. 23 Particularly vicious were the
taxes which some of the states levied on imports from other states.
Madison reported that Connecticut taxed imports from Massachusetts
higher than imports even from Great Britain. 24 A source of dissatisfaction, he wrote, "was the peculiar situation of the States, which
having no convenient ports for foreign commerce were subject to be
taxed by their neighbors, through whose ports their commerce was
carried on. New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York,
was likened to a cask tapped at both ends: and North Carolina between Virginia and South Carolina to a patient bleeding at both arms.
The Articles of Confederation provided no remedy for the complaint,
which produced a strong protest on the part of New Jersey; and
never ceased to be a source of dissatisfaction and discord, until the
new Constitution, superseded the old."' 25 Out of this type of disastrous condition came several provisions of the Constitution prohibiting the states from taxing imports or exports or tonnage without
the consent of Congress," prohibiting Congress from taxing exports, 27 and from giving preference to the ports of any state, 28 and
vesting in Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign
' "It may be doubted," said Chief justice Marshall, "whether any of the
evils proceeding from the feebleness of the Federal Government contributed
more to that great revolution which introduced the present system, than the
deep and general conviction that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress."
Brown v. Maryland, supra note 11 at 446. And Mr. Justice Johnson had said,
"if there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the
Constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free
from all invidious and partial restraints." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 231,
6 L. ed. 23 (U. S. 1824). See THE FEDERALIST (1842) 31; FARRAND, THE
FRAMING OF THE' CONSTITUTIoN (1913) 12, 45; WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE
CoNSIrUT oN (1928) 567.
"3 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAI. CONVENTION (1911) 548.
Id. at 542.
' Art. 1, §9, cl. 5.
'Art. I, §10, cl. 2, 3.

'Art. I, §9, cl. 6.
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nations and among the several states ....
"29
The terms "imports"
and "exports," have been interpreted as applicable only to foreign
commerce,3 0 and "tonnage" refers only to vessels. 8 1 Hence the restrictions on state taxation of interstate trade have developed under
the Commerce Clause.
There can be no doubt that the Supreme Court's nullification of
state taxes which discriminate against interstate commerce has contributed to the harmonious relations among the states. There is today as much need for this restraining hand as there was in 1787.
Only recently North Carolina sought to exact a tax from produce
truckers selling within the state while offering an exemption if the
produce were grown in North Carolina.3 2 Too often the state legislature attempts to protect local trade from the competition of outsiders. "I do not think the United States would come to an end,"
Mr. Justice Holmes has said, "if we lost our power to declare an
Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if
we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several
states. For one in my place sees how often a local policy prevails
with those who are not trained to national views and how often
action is taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was meant
33
to end."
If it were a question of impairing the indispensable freedom of
commercial relations among tlue states, the answer should be that the
present discrimination against local enterprise is a small price to pay
Art. I, §8, cl. 3. Some of the members of the Convention also feared to

intrust the regulation of commerce to a majority of the national legislature.
Charles Pinckney moved that: "No Act of the Legislature for the purpose of
regulating the commerce of the United States with foreign powers or among
the several States shall be passed without the assent of two thirds of the members of each House." WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928)
461, also 397; 3 FARRAND, THL RECORDS OF THE FEDERAT, CoNvEN ioN (1911)

164.

" Woodruff v. Parham, & Wall. 123, 19 L. ed. 382 (U. S. 1868) ; Pittsburg

Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U. S. 590, 15 Sup. Ct. 459, 39 L. ed. 544 (1895) ;

Cf.

SPAHR, THE SUPREME COURT ON THE INCIDENCE AND EFFECTS OF TAXATION

(1925) 135.
" State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204, 20 L. ed. 370 (U. S. 1870);
Huse v. Glover 119 U. S. 543, 7 Sup. Ct. 313, 30 L. ed. 487 (1886).

Gramling v. Maxwell, 52 F. (2d) 256 (W. D. N. C. 1931) (A specially

constituted thfee-judge federal court declared the tax unconstitutional since it
discriminated against the products of other states and so constituted a burden

on interstate commerce. No appeal was taken); See Ward v. Maryland, 12
Wall. 418, 20 L. ed. 449 (U. S. 1871) ; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L.
ed. 347 (1875); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344, 26 L. ed. 565 (1880);
Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 6 Sup. Ct. 454 (1886) ; Bethlehem Motors
Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 41 Sup. QCt.571, 65 L. ed. 1029 (1921).
" SPEECHES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1918) 102.
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for the benefits accruing to the nation. It is believed, however, that
interstate commerce could be made to pay its way without obstructing
this commerce. It does not appear that the property taxation of the
agencies of interstate commerce nor the taxation of net income has
unduly impeded commercial intercourse. A tax on gross income is
disapproved because it exacts its toll whether or not the commerce is
profitable and may thereby become a prohibition.3 4 Yet a property
tax may do the same. Although the decisions are against the proposition, it does seem that a privilege tax, for example, the sales tax,
which applies to business in general and in no way singles out interstate commerce should be valid. The mere fact that a tax falls in
the class termed "privilege taxes" should not proclaim its invalidity.
The tax should be unconstitutional only when it is an unwarranted
exaction by the state. 35 Whether it is unwarranted is a question
similar to the validity of state taxation under the fourteenth amendment, with the additional factor of a stronger national interest.
That, however, is not the law. In the face of the interdiction
against the application of its tax to interstate commerce, how may a
consumers sales tax state effectuate its program ? It desires to tax
consumption within the state. To attempt collection from all consumers is administratively impractical. Consequently the legislature
drafts its statute as a merchants' privilege tax and thereby narrows
the task of collection, yet provides that the merchant shall pass the
tax on to the purchaser. 86 Consumers find that if they order their
goods to come from outside the state they do not have a sales tax
added to the price. Suppose a state, which has a three per cent retail
"Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292, 38 Sup. Ct. 126, 62 L. ed.
295 (1917) (gross receipts from foreign commerce) ; Philadelphia and Southern S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 7 Sup. Ct. 1118, 30 L. ed. 1200
(1887) ; Galveston, H. and S.. A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 28 Sup. Ct. 638,
52 L. ed. 1031 (1908) ; Meyer v. Wells, Fargo and Co., 223 U. S. 298, 32 Sup.
Ct. 218, 56 L. ed. 445 (1912)-; New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board, 280
U. S. 338, 50 Sup. Ct. 111, 74 L. ed. 463 (1930). However, a gross receipts tax
is valid if in reality a substitute for a property tax. United States Express Co.
v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 32 Sup. Ct. 328, 56 L. ed. 459 (1912) ; Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450, 38 Sup. Ct. 373, 62 L. ed. 827 (1918) ;
Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330, 43 Sup. Ct. 366, 67 L. ed. 682 (1923).
Notes (1914)75 28 HARv. L. REv. 93; (.1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 1062; (1930) 39
YALE L. J. 0,- (1930) 14 MINN. L. REv. 811; (1930) 18 CALIF. L. REv. 512.
"Nor can I find any practical justification . . . for an interpretation of
the commerce clause which would relieve those engaged in interstate commerce
from their fair share of the expense of government of the states in which they
operate by exempting them from the payment of a tax of general application,
which is neither aimed at nor discriminates against interstate commerce", per
Stone, J., concurring in Helson v. Kentucky, supra note 9 at 253.
'Supra note 10.
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sales tax, imposed on the use of goods within the state a tax of three
per cent of the purchase price, but provided that if the merchant
selling the goods paid to the state three per cent of the sales price
then the user would not be liable to the tax. Assume, of course, that
the use is an intrastate one. The sale, however, is made in interstate
commerce,--is the statute constitutional? An argument for its validity runs in this manner. As far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, a state could tax simply the use of goods. 37 It could tax"the
use of goods which have not paid a sales tax.8 8 The posed statute
does nothing more than this. It does not tax the vendor, but only
invites him to make a payment to the state in order that his customers
will not be placed in the position of consuming goods which have not
contributed to the expenses of the state on an equality with other
goods consumed. The state does not try to reach any extraterritorial
values, nor does it discriminate against interstate commerce. It expects the merchant to add the tax to the selling price. The desire to
collect from merchants outside the state is for the more efficient
administration of the tax. It is believed that the decisions would
sustain this type of legislation imposing a like tax on ust and on
sale. 89
Assuming that it is constitutional, would such a statute solve the
administrative problem? The thought is that the merchant would pay
the tax to relieve his customers of a use tax. But if the sales tax
and the tax on use are at the same rate, the merchant might say to his
customer, "If I pay this tax it will be added to your price, while if I
do not pay it they may try to collect it from you, but even so the cost
to you would be no more." Suppose, however, the use tax were four
per cent and it were provided that if the merchant paid three per cent
the customer would not be liable to. the four per cent tax. If the
state enforced collection in a number of cases, would this induce the
merchant to pay the smaller amount, add it to his price, and save the

Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642, 41 Sup. Ct. 606, 65 L. ed.
1139 (1921). As to a use tax being in effect a property tax and consequently
subject to state constitutional restrictions on property taxes, see Dawson v.
Kentucky Distilleries Co.; 255 U. S. 288, 41 Sup. Ct. 272, 65 L. ed. 638 (1921) ;
Thompson v. McLeod, 112 Miss. 383, 73 So. 193 (1916) ; note (1921) 35 HARv.
L. REv. 70; cf. Jerome H. Sheip Co. v. Amos, 100 Fla. 863, 130 So. 699 (1930).
Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., supra note 37; Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499, 49 Sup. Ct. 188, 73 L. ed. 475 (1929) ; Gregg Dyeing Co.
v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 52 Sup. Ct. 631, 76 L. ed. 1232 (1932).
See Nashville etc. R. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. ed.
730 (1933) ; Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, supra note 38; Edelman v. Boeing Air
Transport, Inc., 289 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 591, 77 L. ed. 1155 (1933).
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customer from a heavier tax? If he did, not pay this he might lose
the customers against whom a four per cent tax was enforced. And
therein the statute may run afoul of the Commerce Clause. For the
use tax has been sustained "on the assumption-that the tax does not
discriminate against the commodity because of its origin in another
state."'40 Although in many instances the use tax exists only because
the commodity originated in another state, apparently it is considered
that there is not a discrimination on account of origin if the rate is
no higher than for the sales tax. Since the supposed statute would
carry the higher tax on use only to facilitate collection of a nondiscriminatory rate, conceivably it might be sanctioned. 4 1 Yet if the
Court countenanced this, it might just as well permit directly the
taxation of sales in interstate commerce as to permit this justifiable
circumvention. Indirection, however, is not unknown in taxation.
In a more direct effort to correct the disadvantageous position of
the sales tax, the North Caroliha Department of Revenue has suggested that Congress authorize the states to tax certain sales in interstate commerce. The proposed bill provides:
"That all taxes levied by any state upon sales of property or
measured by sales of property may be Jevied upon or measured by
sales of property in interstate commerce by the state into which the
property is moved for use or consumption therein, in the same manner and to the same extent that said taxes are levied upon or measured by sales of property not in interstate commerce. Provided: that
no state shall discriminate against sales of property in interstate commerce; nor shall any state discriminate against the sale of the products of any other state. Provided, further: that no state shall tax the
sale in interstate commerce of property transported for the purpose
of resale by the consignee as a merchant or as a manufacturer. Provided, further: that no county, city, or town, or other subdivision
of any state shall levy a tax upon or measure any tax by sales of
42
property in interstate commerce."1
'6Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, supra note 38 at 479; See Hart Refineries v.
4 Cf. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 46 Sup. Ct. 260, 70 L. ed.

Harmon, supra note 38 at 502.

557 (1926) ("A forbidden tax cannot be enforced in order to facilitate the
collection of one properly laid").
"The North Carolina Department of Revenue has sent letters containing
this proposal to the revenue departments of the various states soliciting their
suggestions.

A bill embodying a more comprehensive permission for state taxation of
interstate commerce was introduced in the Senate by Senator Thomas of Oklahoma on January 15, 1932, at the request of the Oklahoma Tax Commission.
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The proposal selects the state of consumption'as the place where
taxation of a sale in interstate commerce will be permitted. In this
way it limits taxation of a sale to one state, and, on the theory that
the consumer will pay the tax, selects the state into which the property is shipped for use or consumption. Because the state will collect
a tax at the time of resale the permission does not extend to sales of
property which will be resold by the merchant or manufacturer.
Two questions are preEminent. What would be the constitutional
status of the measure if passed by Congress? Would it enable the
states more effectively to collect the sales tax?
Immediately one is reminded of the type of legislation embodied
in the Wilson Act and in the Webb-Kenyon Act permitting the application of state prohibition laws to shipments of liquors into a dry
state. Very clearly the tax proposal is derived from that type of
statute. Consequently, an inquiry into the theory there developed
will be undertaken with a view to its application to the present
proposal.
In Leisy v. Hardin4 3 the Court had held that a state law prohibiting the sale of liquor was an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce when enforced against a sale in the original package.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller wrote the opinion in this case and at several
places suggested that Congress had the power to place the liquor traffic
under the control of the states.4 4 Promptly Congress passed the
Wilson Act which provided that upon arrival in a state liquor should
be subject to the police laws of the state in the same manner as liquor
produced there. 45 In Re Rahrer4" brought up the Wilson Act for a
The bill was entitled, "A bill granting consent to the several States to tax
property employed, and business done in interstate commerce". It provided,
"That each of the several States may levy and collect, license, franchise, gross
revenue, registration, or any other forms of taxes upon, or measured by, any
property employed, or business done, within such State, in interstate commerce in the same manner and to the same extent as such taxes may be imposed under the constitution and laws of such State upon like property employed, and business done, in commerce wholly within the State, except that
(a) in no case shall the tax imposed be at a greater rate than is assessed upon
like property employed, and business done, in commerce wholly within the
State, and (b) nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize
the taxation of the same property and business by more than one State." Two
companion bills were introduced in the House of Representatives. It appears
that no action was taken on these bills.
" 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. ed. 128 (1890).
"Ibid. at 109, 110, 113.
"26 STAT. 313 (1890). "An act to limit the effect of the regulations of
commerce between the several States and with foreign countries in certain
cases.
"That all fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquors or liquids trans-
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constitutional test and it was sustained as a valid regulation of interstate commerce. The opinion, again by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller,
interpreted the act as divesting intoxicating liquor of its interstate
commerce character upon its arrival in a dry state. Congress did not
delegate its power to regulate interstate commerce. Congress itself
by the Wilson Act regulated that commerce by stripping the commodity of a character which had placed it outside of state regulation. Previously the commodity retained that character while in the
original package. Now it was retained only until arrival in the state,
and after that, original package or not, it was subject to state law.
The value of this statute in the enforcement of state prohibition was
lessened, however, when the words "upon arrival" were so interpreted as not to permit the state law to operate until after delivery
to the consignee. 47 To remedy this the Webb-Kenyon Act was
passed. 48 It prohibited the transportation of liquor into a state
ported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption,
sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject
to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in
the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner
as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory,
and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in
the original packages or otherwise."
140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 39 L. ed. 572 (1891) ; see Pabst Brewing
Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. S. 17, 25 Sup. Ct. 552, 49 L. ed. 925 (1905) ; Foppiano
v. Speed, 199 U.. S. 501, 26 Sup. Ct. 138, 50 L. ed. 288 (1905) ; Delamater v.
South Dakota, 205 U. S. 93, 27 Sup. Ct. 447, 51 L. ed. 724 (1907) ; Phillips v.
Mobile, 208 U. S. 472, 28 Sup. Ct. 370, 52 L. ed. 578 (1908) ; DeBarry and Co.
v. Louisiana, 227 U. S. 108, 33 Sup. Ct. 239, 57 L. ed. 441 (1913).
"Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 18 Sup. Ct. 664, 42 L. ed. 1088 (1898);
see, American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133, 25 Sup. Ct. 182, 49 L. ed.
417 (1905) ; Heyman v. Southern Railway Co., 203 U. S. 270, 27 Sup. Ct. 104,
51 L. ed. 178 (1906) ; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129, 27 Sup.
Ct. 606, 51 L. ed. 987 (1907) ; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218,
29 Sup. Ct. 633, 53 L. ed. 972 (1909) ; Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568, 35
Sup. Ct. 419, 59 L. ed. 721 (1915); Rossi v. Pennsylvania, 238 U. S. 62, 35
Sup. Ct. 627, 59 L. ed. 1201 (1915) ; Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241
U. S. 48, 36 Sup. Ct. 510, 60 L. ed. 880 (1916).
' 37 STAT. 699 (1913).
"An Act Divesting intoxicating liquors of their
interstate character in certain cases.
"That the shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means
whatsoever, of any . . . intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one State ...
into any other State, . . . which said . . . intoxicating liquor is intended, by
any person interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner
used, either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of
such State, . . . is hereby prohibited." This act was passed over the veto of
President Taft who believed it to be unconstitutional as a delegation of the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 49 CONG. Rxc. 4291

(1913).
The Reed Amendment [39 STAT. 1058, at 1069 (1917)] made it a federal
crime to "order, purchase, or cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in
interstate commerce . . . into any State or Territory the laws of which State
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where the liquor was intended to be used or sold in violation of the
state's law. It will be noted that this statute was different in form
from the Wilson Act. Whereas the Webb-Kenyon Act was written
as a Congressional prohibition of the transportation of liquor, the
Wilson Act prohibited nothing, but subjected the commodity to state
law. Nevertheless, the Court regarded the two acts as based upon
the identical theory,-the earlier one as divesting liquor of its interstate commerce character upon delivery to the consignee, and the
subsequent one but an extension to divest liquor of that protective
attribute at the moment it entered a state for use in violation of the
state's laws. "No reason is perceived," said Mr. Chief Justice Fuller,
"why if Congress chooses to provide that certain designated subjects
of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests
them of that character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it is not within its competency to do so.' 49 And
when the Webb-Kenyon Act came before the Court in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co., Mr. Chief Justice
White considered it "but a larger exertion of the identical power" 50
employed in the Wilson Act.
It would seem that this "divesting theory" was not the only available interpretation of the Wilson Act. It had been said in Leisy v.
Hardin that "inasmuch as interstate commerce, consisting in the
transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities, is naor Territory prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquors
for beverage purposes ......
Note that the twenty-first amendment to the Constitution follows the form
of the Webb-Kenyon Act: "Sec. 2. The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
"In re Rahrer, supra note 46 at 562. Compare the phraseology of the acts
proposed by North Carolina and Oklahoma, supra note 42, which are in terms
of Congressional permission, with this statement of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller
at 564 of In re Rahrer, "Congress did not use terms of permission to the State
to act, but simply removed an impediment to the enforcement of the state
laws .

.

. created by the absence of a specific utterance on its part."

W242 U. S. 311, 330, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. ed. 326 (1917). At the conclusion of his opinion Mr. Chief Justice White sought to allay fears that the
power then sustained "lays the basis for subjecting interstate commerce in all
articles to state control and therefore destroys the Constitution". He stated
that the "exceptional power" exerted was grounded on the "exceptional nature
of the subject",-intoxicating liquor. As this indicates that at least the Chief
Justice thought the power had its limits, it should be suggested that there is a
difference between state taxation and state prohibition or exclusion. The Court
might consider that Congress could not authorize the states to exclude articles
of an unexceptional nature and yet consider that Congress could authorize the
collection of reasonable taxes. See, Albertsworth, Congressional Assent to
State Taxation Otherwise Unconstitutional (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 821.
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tional in its character, and must be governed by a uniform system, so
long as Congress does not pass any law to regulate it or allowing the
states so to do, it thereby indicates its will that such commerce shall
be free and untrammelled." 51 In view of this it would have been
reasonable to have said that these commodities may still be in interstate commerce, yet now that Congress has spoken and indicated its
will that this commerce need not be untrammelled, the states now
may regulate. Nothing was said in the Wilson Act about divesting
liquor of its character as a commodity in interstate commerce. The
interpretation seems neither necessary nor convincing. If a gallon
of water and a gallon of liquor are shipped into a dry state the
divesting theory says that the gallon of liquor is not in interstate
commerce if it is intended to be used in violation of the state's laws,
yet the gallon of water is in interstate commerce.
After Mr. Chief Justice Fuller had enunciated the theory of
divestment by law, Congress attached that label to its next enactment. The Webb-Kenyon Act was entitled "An Act divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain cases." Yet,
strange to say, the body of the act did not continue that simple
52
phraseology, but instead it purported to prohibit transportation.
Still, the act carried no penalty for its infringement, and if it were to
be given any effect at all the Court had to find more in the words
than their normal meaning. The legislative history of the act showed
clearly that Congress intended to divest intoxicants of their protected
character at a point earlier than was permitted by the interpretation
given "on arrival" in the Wilson Act.53 Congress intended to extend
the theory of In Re Rahrer, yet there were doubts of the constitutionality of the statutory form which" that case approved. It was
believed that a prohibition would more safely be a regulation of
interstate commerce than the implication contained in a subjection to
state law. When Congress says that a transaction heretofore considered interstate commerce shall be subject to state law, the Court
could say either that this means that the transaction is no longer
interstate commerce and so is subject to state law, or that it means
that though still interstate commerce Congress intends that the states
may regulate because Congress does not think that the subject re" Supra note 43 at 109.
"Supra note 48.
" See Dowling and Hubbard, Divesting An Article of Its Interstate Character (1920) 5 MINN. L. REv. 100, 253.
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quires uniform regulation, or it might say that this is a delegation of
the power to regulate interstate commerce and so is unconstitutional.
As the Court had accorded the first meaning to the Wilson Act, Congress desired that it should find that meaning in the Webb-Kenyon
Act, and thought that prohibitory terminology would express Congressional divestment and not leave it to the generosity of the Court.
For our purposes the important point is that the Court might,
consistently with Leisy v. Hardin, have interpreted the Wilson Act
as expressing the will of Congress that the states might regulate the
liquor traffic in interstate commerce because Congress felt that this
traffic need not be unencumbered, and that the Webb-Kenyon Act
continued the divestment idea because of its adjudged constitutionality. Such an interpretation is thought to be preferable to the theory
of divestment because it avoids a conflict with fact and because it
more easily permits an extension of state action without the embarrassments incident to the divestment idea. For example, suppose
Congress passed a statute such as the proposal to permit the consuming state to tax sales in interstate commerce. It would be artificial
to an extreme to say that the sale is not an interstate commerce
transaction when taxed by the consuming state, whereas it is in interstate commerce if the producing state levies the tax; or that if the
consuming state attempts to discriminate against a transaction which
theretofore had been considered a sale in interstate commerce, the
transaction resumes its interstate commerce character. Of course,
logic is embarrassed in a similar way when the divestment theory is
applied to the liquor traffic.
The constitutional approach which is suggested for the tax statute
admits that the sales involve interstate commerce; that they are national in character; that the states may not so regulate the sales as to
conflict with the will of Congress; and that by its silence Congress
has indicated that it intends for the sales to remain untaxed. But
Congress may break its silence, does so by this statute, and manifests
its will that the states may tax the sales in the prescribed manner.
This seems to follow from the suggestion made by Mr. Justice
Brewer in a license tax case, when he wrote, "it is settled that nothing
which is a direct burden upon interstate commerce can be imposed
by the State suithout the assent of Congress."54
The idea that an expression from Congress might permit state
" Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 302, 14 Sup. Ct. 829, 38 L. ed. 719

(1894).

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
regulation of interstate commerce in matters of national concern is
derived from the statement found in a similar form in a number of
decisions, that the inaction of Congress "is equivalent to a declaration
that inter-State commerce shall be free and untrammelled."" If by
its silence Congress can regulate interstate commerce, it is arguable
that a declaration from Congress that the states may tax interstate
commerce in the way in which it directs is also a regulation of commerce. Then the state taxes may validly be applied to interstate
commerce because such does not conflict with the Congressional will.
In comparison with the tax immunity of interstate commerce consider the state taxation of national banks. McCulloch v. Maryland"
early established the rule that the states may not interfere by taxation
with the agencies of the federal government. In 1863 Congress provided for the organization of the national banking associations,57 federal agencies, and the next year Congress gave the states permission to tax the real property of the banks and the shares of
stock.5 8 Promptly the validity of this permission was questioned in
Van Allen v. The Assessors," and there sustained. Mr. Justice
Nelson, who wrote the opinion, appears to have been of the belief
that the states could tax the shares of stock of the banks so long as
not forbidden by Congress, and as a result certainly Congress could
declare that taxation of a specified kind would be permissible. 0 A
"Welton v. Missouri, supra note 32 at 282; Philadelphia and Southern S. S.
Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 34 at 336; The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283,
462, 12 L. ed. 702 (U. S. 1849); County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691,
697, 26 L. ed. 238 (1881) ; Robins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., supra note 3
at 493; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 473, 8 Sup. Ct. 564, 31 L. ed. 508
(1888); see Bikl6, The Silence of Congress (1927) 41 HARV. L. Rav. 121;
Dowling, State Control of Interstate Power Transmission--The Doctrine of
CongressionalPermission (1930) 14 PRoc. AcAD. POL. Sci. 132; Scott, State
and Federal Control of Power Transmission as Affected by the Interstate
Commerce Clause (1930) 14 PRoc. ACAD. Po. Scr. 135. Scott points out that
there is nothing novel in the theory of Congressional permission. He finds
the theory in two acts of 1790 directing the revenue officers of the United
States to aid in the execution of state quarantine laws relating to vessels in
interstate or in foreign commerce [1 STAT. 474, 619 (1790)]. Two acts have
modeled upon the Wilson Act. In 1902 Congress subjected oleomargarine to
the police laws of the state upon arrival in the state [32 STAT. 193 (1902)].
The Hawes-Cooper Act of 1929 subjects convict-made goods to the state's
law upon arrival and delivery therein [45 STAT. 1084 (1929)].
" 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (U. S. 1819).
" 12 STAT. 665 (1863).
13 STAT. 112 (1864), 12 U. S. C. A. §31 (1926).
"3 Wall. 573, 18 L. ed. 229 (U. S. 1866).
0Ibid. at 585, "It is said that Congress possesses no power to confer upon
a state authority to be exercised which has been exclusively delegated to that
body by the Constitution and, consequently that it cannot confer upon a State
the sovereign right of taxation; nor is a State competent to receive a grant
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convincing interpretation of the action of Congress, which has been
suggested, is that the national banking system is a Congressional
creation and that, within limits, Congress should be able to determine
the characteristics it must possess to accomplish its aims; and that
Congress can determine that tax immunity is not a characteristic
necessary to the fulfillment of its purpose. 61
The analogy between the power of Congress to authorize state
taxation of national banks and the suggested power to authorize taxation of interstate commerce is not complete, but the points of difference are not thought to be impelling. Nothing is said in the Constitution about the immunity from taxation of federal instrumentalities.
Indeed, nothing is said concerning the immunity of interstate commerce, yet it is known that one of the reasons for delegating to Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce was obnoxious state
taxation. 62 So it may be suggested that the purpose in placing interstate commerce under the federal domain was to make certain that it
could not be taxed by the states. However, this commerce has not
remained entirely free from taxation, 63 and furthermore, had the
of any such power from Congress. We agree to this. But as it respects a
subject-matter over which Congress and the States may exercise a concurrent
power, but from the exercise of which Congress, by reason of its paramount
authority, may exclude the States, there is no doubt Congress may withhold
the exercise of that authority and leave the States free to act." Later cases
have not followed Mr. Justice Nelson's reasoning, but have held that the
state's power to tax national banks is only that expressly permitted by Congress. People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539, 25 L. ed. 705 (1879) ; Owensboro
National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. 537, 43 L. ed. 850
(1898) ; First Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 269 U. S.341, 46 Sup. Ct. 135, 70 L. ed.
295 (1926) ; see Schweppe, State Taxation of National Banks, Uncertainty of
Its Constitutional Basis (1922) 6 MINN. L. Rnv. 219.
' Rottschaefer, State Taxation of National Bank Siares (1923) 7 MIN. L.
RFv. 357, 378; see Traynor, National Bank Taxation, in California (1929) 17
CALIF. L. Rxv. 83, 88.
Supra note 23.
Supra notes 13 and 14. In comparing interstate commerce and federal
instrumentalities, note the statement of Holmes, J., that, "The criterion of
interference by the States with interstate commerce is one of degree. It is
well understood that a certain amount of reaction upon and interference with
such commerce cannot be avoided if the States are to exist and make laws....
The rule as to instrumentalities of the United States on the other hand is
absolute in form and at least stricter in substance." Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257
U. S.501, 505, 42 Sup. Ct. 171, 172, 66 L. ed. 338 (1922). Compare this with
the statements in supra note 12.
Gillespie v. Oklahoma held that income received by a lessee of restricted
Indian lands could not be taxed, since the lessee was "an instrumentality used
by the United States in carrying out duties to the Indians." It should be noted
that the power of Congress to protect the Indians as wards of the nation has
supplemented the expressed power of Congress "to regulate commerce ...
with the Indian tribes." Brown, The Taxation of Indian Property (1931) 15
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makers of the Constitution sufficiently feared the wisdom of a particular type of Congressional regulation of interstate commerce, they
might have explicitly forbidden state taxation of it, as they did explicitly forbid Congress to tax articles exported from a state. 4 The
importance of the bank tax situation is that there state taxation has
developed under the guidance of an expressed Congressional policy.
On the other hand, the rule that the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce cannot be taxed by the states developed independently
of an expressed policy. Iad Congress spoken, the rule might be
different.
Briefly, this is thought to be the constitutional status of the proposal. The statute, itself, would stand as an expressed regulation of
interstate commerce, as opposed to the existing silent regulation. If
the silence of Congress can be a regulation that interstate commerce
shall remain untaxed an expression that it may or may not be taxed
should as well be a regulation. Such state taxation of interstate
commerce as has been considered unconstitutional has been invalid
because in conflict with the implied intention of Congress that the
commerce should be unimpeded. This conflict ceases when Congress
expresses its intention that interstate commerce shall be subject to
non-discriminatory state taxation.
If this reasoning is sound and the power of the states to tax
interstate commerce thus may be enlarged by Congressional assent,
to what extent would this permission enable the states to collect the
sales tax? The proposal removes the Commerce Clause obstruction
to taxation of local sales of property situated without the state by the
state into which the property moves. The number of these sales,
however, may be relatively small. Will the simple device of making
the sale in some state other than the state of consumption thwart
collection? The sale itself could not be taxed since that would then
be extraterritorial."5 Suppose the state turns to such an arrangement
see King, Taxation of Capital Employed in Interstate
Commerce (1932) PRoc. NAT. TAx. Ass'N. 235, 236.
" Supra note 27.
"It has been suggested that a state statute taxing sales might stipulate that
the place of delivery is the place of sale. If the state could tax delivery it
should be able to tax it under another name.
Still, could not the parties
arrange for delivery outside the state? The purchaser or his agent would then

MiNN. L. Rv.182;

bring the property into the state.

Another suggestion is that Congress might provide in the proposed statute
that "every contract for the sale of goods transported, or to be transported, in
interstate commerce shall be considered as made within the state into which
the goods are to be transported for use or consumption therein whenever such
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as the four per cent use tax where a three per cent sales tax has not
been paid. The objection already discussed was that the higher use
tax might be unconstitutional as in effect a discrimination against the
property on account of its origin and hence invalid under the Commerce Clause. Since the proposed Act of Congress would permit
taxation of the sale so far as the Commerce Clause is concerned, that
Clause should not be infringed if the state adopted a higher tax on
use to enforce the non-discriminatory sales tax. The difficulty then
becomes one of jurisdiction.
If there is not in the taxing state a taxable factor of the transaction, the higher use tax may be invalid as coercing a payment because
of an act done in another state. Viewed in its most unfavorable
light, it is similar to one state exacting a higher tax on a man's property within the state because he or someone else does not pay to it a
tax on property outside the jurisdiction. It may be possible, however, to find a local factor in the transaction which would justify a
tax measured by a sale, although actually the event which consummates the sale occurs beyond the state's borders. When a merchant
sends agents into a state and solicits orders, there is a local factor
connected with the sale. Except for the Commerce Clause the state
could tax these activities and should be able to measure the tax by
the amount of sales to which they are incident.68 If the state taxed
sale is made, solicited or negotiated in whole or in part within that state." If

the sale does take place in interstate commerce, and there are elements of the
transaction in the consuming state, it may be within the power of Congress to
say that the sale is there consummated. Suppose, however, the parties arrange
that the sale shall be an intrastate transaction. If the goods are to be transported in interstate commerce ptrsuant to the sale, the sale itself is interstate
commerce. But if there is a sale and then the goods are shipped not pursuant
thereto but simply after the sale, can Congress say the sale is in interstate
commerce? If Congress can determine when interstate commerce ceases, can
it in like manner determine when interstate commerce begins?
"In American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, 35 Sup. Ct 522, 63 L.
ed. 1084 (1919), a tax on the privilege of manufacturing in St. Louis, measured by "the amount of sales of the manufactured goods, whether sold within
or without the State, and whether in domestic or interstate commerce" was
sustained as not being a, regulation of interstate commerce or as taxing
property or business transactions outside the state. There Mr. Justice Pitney
said, at 463, "There is no doubt of the power of the State, or of the city acting
under its authority, to impose a license tax in the nature of an excise upon the
conduct of a manufacturing business in the city.... The city might have
measured such tax by a .percentage upon the value of all goods manufactured,
whether they ever should come to be sold or not, and have required payment
as soon as, or even before, the goods left the factory. In order to mitigate the
burden ....
it has postponed ascertainment and payment of the tax until the
manufacturer can bring the goods into market." So here, if the'Commerce
Clause objection to taxing the soliciting of interstate commerce orders is removed, the state might tax-the soliciting at, say three per cent of the price at
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sales three per cent and taxed the privilege of soliciting orders within
the state, for sales to be concluded outside the state three per cent of
the sales price, that would not discriminate against interstate commerce; neither would it tax an act without the state nor measure it
by an unwarranted value. The state would expect the tax to be paid
by the merchant and expect that he would add it to his price to the
consumer. To enforce the tax the state would have its cause of
action against the merchant. In addition,-a four per cent tax might
be imposed upon the use or consumption of property which would be
subject to either the sales tax or the soliciting tax and which had not
been paid at a specified time after the sale. This tax incurred by the
user would be intended to have the effect of inducing the merchant
to pay the tax. In short, a system embodying the following taxes
might be expected to exact contribution from all consumption within
the state: (1) a tax on sales within the state; (2) a tax on the
privilege of soliciting orders within the state, for sales to be made
outside the state, measured by the resulting sales; (3) a tax on the
use or consumption of property, which is not exempt, but which is
neither sold nor for which orders are solicited within the state; (all
of the preceding taxes would be at the same rate) ; (4) a tax at a
higher rate on use or consumption of property subject to one of the
preceding taxes and upon which that tax has not been paid at a
specified time. These taxes are all imposed upon acts done within
the taxing jurisdiction, and they do not discriminate against the
property because of its origin in another state. The assent of Congress to state taxation of sales in interstate commerce and a series of
taxes of the nature of those suggested should lessen the difficulty of
administering a consumption tax, since the merchant would be taxed
on intrastate sales, on interstate commerce sales made in the state
when the property is to be used or consumed in the state; and on
the large volume of solicited orders.. 7 For other consumption the tax
which the property is offered for sale. The suggested tax is more lenient. It
measures the tax by the resulting sales. Cf. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall,
xupra note 8 at 289, where a natural gas production tax measured by the value
of the gas, was sustained on the understanding that the value was that at the
well and'not the value of the gas in interstate commerce or outside the state.
'Would the assent of Congress to state taxation of interstate commerce
enlarge a state's power to require domestication? A foreign corporation engaged in intrastate business may be required to domesticate. If its sole business
in the state is interstate commerce domestication cannot be required. Immunity here rests on the same ground as immunity from privilege taxation.
Still, Congressional permission to tax might fot on the theory herein developed
permit enforcement of domestication, since the theory is that Congress says
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on use with its difficulties of collection from individual consumers
still would remain. Yet the penalty of the higher tax might induce
payment of the normal tax. In the case of large purchases that
should be a solution.
The proposal made by the North Carolina Department of Revenue is an attempt to remove the unjustified tax immunity of sales in
interstate commerce. It is believed that the assent of Congress would
displace the constitutional barrier to state taxation in this field, but
the fact that there are serious problems of collection after the
Commerce Clause has been hurdled should not be minimized.
Whether the difficulties of jurisdiction inherent in our federal system
are an insuperable obstacle to state collection must be admitted to be
problematical. There is also the question of whether it is desirable
for the states to develop still another heterogeneous system of taxation. This is the more doubtful when there is the possibility of the
sales tax being levied and collected by the federal government and
distributed to the states, which would eliminate the difficulties of
interstate commerce, jurisdiction and multifarious taxes.
that taxation of a sort is permissible; it says nothing about domestication. It

might be that the requirement of domestication is necessary to the collection of
the taxes and so included in permission to tax. That should be expressly stated.

